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Employment of Warsaw Pact Forces Against NATO


Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Top Secret

NI IIM 83-10002

July 1983

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


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NI IIM 83-10002
EMPLOYMENT OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AGAINST NATO
Information available as of 1 April 1983 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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


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	PRE	FACE			
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the Director of Cent					
volume to NIE 11-1 was intended to elabo					
of Warsaw Pact thea					
sion incorporates nev		_			
frontal operations, i					
Memorandum					25X1
This Memorand	um provides a	detailed discussi	on of general Soviet		
concepts for front-le					
nuclear operations. It					
against NATO in the aters of Military Ope					
Memorandum review					
employment of Pact		or options for	It		25 X 1
recognizes, however					
largely by the circum					
of NATO and Pact th					25X1
This Memorano	dum was prod	duced under th	ne auspices of the		
National Intelligence			orces. It was drafted telligence, Central		25X1
Intelligence Agency,				•	
gence Agency; the D	Oefense Intellig	ence Agency; the	e National Security		
Agency; the Bureau o					051/4
the intelligence comp	ponents of the	military services.			25 X 1
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SUMMARY	
EMPLOYMENT OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AGAINST NATO	
The USSR's geographic position as a major continental power in	
Europe and Asia and the Soviet perception that hostile neighbors	
confront the USSR and its allies on virtually every side have led the	
Warsaw Pact to develop contingency plans for military operations on all	
its land and maritime frontiers. The Soviets clearly expect Central	
Europe to be the decisive arena in a war with NATO and assign it the highest priority in the allocation of military manpower and equipment.	
flighest priority in the anocation of inilitary manpower and equipment.	25X1
The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in other NATO	
regions flanking Central Europe, but we have little direct evidence on	
the Pact's view of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an	
offensive in Central Europe. Nonetheless, even if they did not begin	
major ground offensives immediately in some flank areas, the Pact	
would conduct secondary offensives to keep NATO from shifting forces	
to Central Europe, to compel commitment of NATO reserves, and to weaken NATO forces on the flanks in anticipation of further operations.	
weaken 1471 to forces on the flanks in anticipation of farther operations.	25 X 1
The Pact's success in achieving its wartime objectives would	
depend on the Soviets' ability to control and coordinate multinational,	
joint-service operations of great complexity. All Pact member nations	
have command and control elements intended to help extend the	
Soviets' wartime control structure. These organs could be integrated	
easily into a Pact command structure. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the Soviet Supreme High Command (Verkhovnoye Glavnoko-	
mandovaniye—VGK) would function, in effect, as the Supreme High	
Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. This	
wartime command would provide the military-strategic leadership for	
all Pact military operations against NATO.	25X1
We believe that, should a war occur between the Warsaw Pact and	
NATO, intermediate commands would be established in Europe be-	
tween the General Staff in Moscow and most operating forces (fronts	
and fleets). These commands would exercise direct operational control	
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over Soviet and Non-Soviet would coordinate the opera support operations in a spheadquarters as High Communication strategic axis. Two such communication the Western Theater of Military D) and the High Communication was believe that these high coof a NATO-Warsaw Pact was	ions of those strategetic area. The Sonands of Forces in mands, the High Coury Operation (teatro) dof Forces in the Sourmands would be es	gic assets allocated to oviets refer to these a designated area or ommand of Forces in coyennykh deystviy—uthwestern TVD since the late 1970s.	
Soviet strategists envision military operations against N	n at least five Europ		
	ny, Poland, and Czec	le Soviet and NSWP choslovakia and Soviet the Combined Baltic	
 The Southwestern T Hungary and the so and Hungarian force 	uthwestern USSR; H	Bulgarian, Romanian,	
 The Northwestern T the Leningrad Milit Northern Fleet. 		clude Soviet forces in ements of the Soviet	
 The Atlantic and A North Atlantic and forces primarily from 	the Norwegian Sea	and would include	
Frontal Operations			
Within a land TVD, the Although not directly compared would be similar to a NATO size, level of command, and for a front. It usually is compared to the size of the tank of the size of th	rable to any Western army group and its a unction. There is no sposed of three to five or motorized rifle div	organization, a front ssociated air forces in standard organization ground armies, each visions, and air forces	
with as many as several hund maritime sector also might chiefly devoted to that from front's sea lines of communic	include those naval e's mission, that is, f	elements that were for protection of the	

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Theater Nucle	ar Operations			
escalate to nuc	roduction of nuclear	weapons	generally precipitated by	25X1 25X1 25X1
use of nuclear v	ar options, I nuclear exchange at veapons is initiated	some point, re		25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
which are Sovie gain and hold factors in Pact f	mission of Pact nuclet) would be to destroy nuclear superiority. T Frontal nuclear operati	y NATO nucles the following pritions:	ar assets in order to points highlight key	
demarc	r targets generally v ation between those t y front-level assets.		•	
on peac	d front-level nuclear settime NATO force departed and could be ation.	eployments, al	most certainly have	
initiate intensif continu weapor	ergetic nuclear target d during a period of t lied during a nonnu al updating of the n as employment had b s suitable targets were	ension and wor clear combat uclear strike p egun, follow-o	uld be continued or phase to provide lans. Once nuclear	
prehost states maxim	wo days' preparation, ilities phase, a front's of readiness that woum number of strikes amount of time	nuclear strike : ould permit tl	assets could achieve	25X1 25X1
priority	g NATO's nuclear do v. Other targets of his ns, also would be struc	gh value, for e	example, maneuver	
of targe for coll	ng and execution of the ets of military significateral damage. Import pably also would be st	ance, with littl tant West Euro	e apparent concern	
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nitized Copy Approved for Release 201	10/08/19 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000100070003-3
— High priority would be prapidly following the initial	placed on resuming the offensive l massive nuclear strikes.
Initial Campaign in the Western	TVD
Soviet planning calls for a mass ground, and naval forces to seize the visions a rapid ground offensive into large-scale air operation to destroy delivery capability—to defeat NAT disrupt mobilization, seize or descriptorcement, and prevent a proleforces would be organized into three in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, reinforced by fronts or elements of USSR. About half of the first ech European forces:	y NATO's air forces and nuclear O nuclear and conventional forces, stroy ports and airfields, prevent onged positional war. First-echelon of forces stationed and Poland and, time permitting, of fronts stationed in the western
would carry out the main attacking NATO forces in c many as six of NATO's eig in the north and Mannheim of five to six armies formed and Poland and two arm	Front would be the largest and effort. It would have the task of central West Germany—engaging as the corps areas—between Hannover in the south. It could be made up from Soviet forces in East Germany ties formed from East Germany's or reinforcements would be providing Front.
— The Polish Front northern part of West G	
Germany. In its more conwould consist at least of armies plus an East German moving along the northern	however, Polish armies on forces in the central part of West mmon role, this front most likely two—and probably three—Polish n army. It would be responsible for coast, up the Jutland Peninsula, and ds. This front most likely would be ltic Front.
	Front would conduct operations on

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	have the mission of attacking NATO forces in the southern part of West Germany. It would consist at least of an army made up of the five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia and two Czechoslovak armies (eight divisions). The Soviet-Carpathian Front would reinforce this front for operations in West Germany and then into southern France.	25X1
	The Air Operation in Central Europe	
prin supe plan deliv air offer desig	Pact planners regard NATO's tactical air forces in Central Europe formidable threat. They believe that airpower would be NATO's acipal means for delivering nuclear strikes. Thus, they consider air eriority critical to the success of their European campaign. The Pact as to achieve air superiority and neutralize much of NATO's nuclear every capability by conducting a large-scale, theaterwide nonnuclear operation during the first several days of hostilities. This air ensive would be characterized by a series of massed airstrikes, gned to achieve tactical surprise, penetrating through corridors in ever air defenses.	25 X 1
2,70 rema	Of the 3,100 tactical aircraft and 400 medium bombers available use in Central Europe, the Pact would commit between 1,200 and 0 tactical aircraft and some 350 bombers for the air operation. The aining aircraft would be used, along with the interceptor forces, to and Pact territory and to provide direct support to the ground forces.	25X1
	Operations in the North Sea and Baltic	
amp laun- to pi lines Cont assau marl	Operations in the North Sea and Baltic would be designed to roy NATO naval and maritime targets, especially carrier and phibious forces. Principal objectives would be to deny the area as a such point for carrier aircraft against the Soviet–East German Front, revent naval reinforcements from entering the Baltic, and to sever a of communication through the North Sea to the European tinent. The Combined Baltic Fleet also would support amphibious all operations in support of ground force operations against Denk and West Germany.	25X1
	The Southwestern TVD would include Pact forces in Hungary,	
	ania, and Bulgaria; the Odessa Military District (MD) in the USSR;	
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by the	e Soviets on a covert transition to a war footing.	25X1
partic	cularly carrier battle groups—and the degree of emphasis placed	
	ch factors as: the size of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron when on began to build, the nature of the Western naval presence—	
	tentation from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean would depend	
	on for the Black Sea Fleet. The nature of any surface ship	
	, and anticarrier warfare probably would be highest priority	
	Mediterranean as the primary naval threat to the southwestern	
	The Soviets probably would view American carrier battle groups in	
N	Naval Operations	
and B	Bulgarian fronts that would prosecute the major offensive	25X1
	d-echelon front responsible for rear area security behind the Soviet	
role de	lepicted for Romanian forces is that of a	25X1
	other than homeland defense. The	25X1 25X1
Gener	rally, the Romanians have balked at any participation	25X1
	t is not clear what role Romanian forces would have in wartime.	0.5
	ngaged against NATO in Europe.	25 X 1
	on Turkey and into Syria, Iraq, or Iran at the same time the Pact	2EV4
Soviets	ts would have the resources to launch a major campaign into	
	resources needed to combat NATO forces. We do not believe the	
	through Syria or to the Persian Gulf through Iraq. A move into n the context of a NATO-Pact war would be possible but could ab-	
•	the way to movement by Soviet forces to the eastern Mediterra-	
would	d prevent Turkish forces from being shifted to the straits and could	
	on the northern Aegean Sea. An offensive against eastern Turkey	
	pressure by Italian forces on Pact flanks in Austria. Movement of a into Greece and western Turkey would give the Pact access to	
	fure the southern flank of the forces in Central Europe and to pre-	
	lack Sea. Forces also would operate in Austria and northern Italy	
primai	arily on securing the Turkish straits and blocking NATO access to	
	dary to an offensive against Central Europe and would focus	
	A Warsaw Pact campaign in the Southwestern TVD would be	
	t TVD	25 X 1
	against Iran and the Persian Gulf if operations were undertaken	
	ort thrusts on a major axis in the Southeastern or Southern TVD ori-	
	a forces from the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus also operate STVD, although some forces from these districts would be likely to	
	aval forces in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.	23 X I
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Initial Campaign in the Northwestern TVD

This TVD would encompass the Scandinavian Peninsula and immediately adjacent waters. Forces in this TVD would come primarily from the Leningrad MD in the USSR, with reinforcements likely to be drawn from the Moscow, Ural, or, possibly, Baltic MDs. A principal ground objective would be to protect the flanks of the Soviet Northern Fleet while it was attempting to achieve control over the Norwegian and Barents Seas. These forces also would have the mission of denying NATO use of its bases in northern Norway. To accomplish these missions, Soviet forces could be expected to attempt to seize the bases along the northern coast of Norway either by direct assault across the Soviet-Norwegian border or through Finland. Amphibious or airborne landings also could be anticipated. In the southern part of the TVD, the Soviets would defend the Leningrad and Vyborg areas. Attacks into southern Finland toward Helsinki would be conducted if necessary to meet or preclude NATO advances in this region. Air operations would consist primarily of flights in support of ground operations in northern Norway or Finland and in southern Finland. Counterair flights, primarily over Soviet territory, would be flown by air defense interceptor units.

Initial Operations in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans


The Soviet Northern Fleet is the most powerful of the Soviet fleets and would carry out the major part of combat operations against NATO naval forces. Its initial tasks would be to achieve control in the Barents, Kara, and northern Greenland and Norwegian Seas in order to protect the Soviet SSBN force and to prevent NATO from staging attacks against the Soviet homeland from those areas. The Soviets probably would establish successive lines of defense in this region with the intention of destroying NATO forces before they approached SSBN operating areas and were within range of Soviet territory. The main functions of Northern Fleet forces in their operating areas would be antisubmarine and antiship warfare as well as amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and coastal defense.

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